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The Taiwanese Dimension  
of the Cross–Strait Equation after  
the Sunflower Movement
For over five decades Taiwan was predominantly perceived by the international 
community as a function of regional balance of power network in East Asia and of 
the United States and People’s Republic of China relations. However, after almost 
30 years of democratic change, Taiwanese internal politics is slowly growing out 
of the diplomatic cross–strait framework and Beijing–Taipei economic rapproche-
ment scenarios. The Sunflower Movement protests and November 29th, 2014 
defeat of ruling Kuomintang in local elections indicate an introduction of a new 
variable – Taiwanese society – in cross–strait formula.
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1. Introduction
Cross–strait as well as internal Taiwanese politics developments during 
the second half of the last term of Taiwan’s President Ma Ying–jeou show 
that both the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC) 
relations are getting close to a political turning point. On one hand, Taiwan 
policymakers have to answer the question concerning the framework of fu-
ture talks with the Mainland. The answer may jeopardize their political po-
sition in the years to come. On the other hand, PRC authorities understand 
that the full potential of Taiwan – Chinese relations based on the economic 
and political status quo has already been reached. In the coming years Chi-
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na’s preferences may not be as (relatively) easily taken into consideration as 
they were during Ma Ying–jeou Presidency. The future of PRC–ROC rela-
tions will require substantial political decisions of both parties. 
The goal of the article is to analyze and present the importance of de-
velopments in Taiwanese internal politics in the abovementioned context. 
ROC’s part of the cross–strait puzzle will be reconstructed on the basis 
of discussions with experts in Taiwan (in particular Soochow University 
Political Sciences Department, but also politicians and social activists), of 
analysis of social and political attitudes of the Taiwanese public opinion 
(the research was conducted (1) during and right after the occupation of Leg-
islative Yuan in March 2014, (2) during the Russian–Ukraine Crimea crisis, 
(3) 25 years after the Tiananmen Square protests – thus scientific discus-
sions on China’s political reforms were abundant) and of document anal-
ysis. As the Taiwanese internal politics dimension of cross–strait relations 
seems to be often overlooked in Europe, the research is also an introduction 
case study of relations between the young Asian democracy and the PRC.
On the basis of the field work conducted in the first half of 2014, despite, 
in tactical terms, an almost certain increase of electoral dynamics in coming 
months, in strategic terms, the political scenario for the coming years 
concerning ROC–PRC relations is to a large extent set. The key to the political 
developments on the Taiwanese side of the cross–strait equation is the ruling 
Kuomintang’s (KMT’s) ability to take a step back, reassess the situation and 
reorganize. It still possesses the biggest political (and financial) potential as 
well as a relatively stable social base and enough popular political personalities 
to substitute the unpopular ruling president and to win with the opposition 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is still perceived by a significant 
part of the society as too bellicose to govern vis–à–vis Mainland China. The 
possible instability involves two critical junctures, partly beyond the control 
of the actors involved: possible conflict of ambitions between President Ma 
and the KMT or possible regional security crisis involving the PRC.
2. Taiwanese Socio–Economic Background  
of the Cross–Strait Relations
Peaceful rapprochement between Taiwan and the PRC observed 
throughout the first and a part of the second term of President Ma Ying–
jeou in office was founded on two pillars: deepening economic cooperation 
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and high level diplomacy. The KMT Government based its strategy most-
ly on building closer economic ties with the Mainland while claiming that 
no political consequences were involved. The strategy was realized mostly 
in the public dimension with the apparent intention to limit popular in-
volvement in obviously complex negotiations. This suited both the PRC’s 
preference for top–down approach to international politics and President 
Ma’s ambitions to be an architect of a new chapter in Taiwan–PRC rela-
tions’ history. It seems that such a political practice has reached its limits, 
though. The first and the most obvious sign was the Sunflower Movement 
and occupation of Legislative Yuan in March 2014. Regardless of how de-
batable the Sunflower Movement remains (compare Hengjun 2014; Chen 
2014), the social discontent behind it highlighted three major character-
istics of Taiwanese political reality which were earlier underestimated in 
political talks with the Mainland.
First, the Taiwanese democracy is too strong not to be taken into ac-
count in high level diplomacy between Taiwan and the PRC. Taiwanese 
citizens seem not to accept any form of “managed democracy” anymore. 
It does not mean Taiwan’s democracy is perfect. It does not even mean it 
is mature. While walking around Legislative Yuan sit–ins in March 2014 
it was sometimes hard not to have the impression of witnessing a naïve-
ly idealistic political happening. However, it was beyond discussion that 
the Taiwanese civic consciousness and democratic attitude became more 
than just instruments of local politics. In particular, the young genera-
tions raised in a post–martial law democratic environment perceive their 
right to participate in the political process as natural. They are independ-
ent elements of political reality that have to be taken into account by all 
the actors involved in Taiwanese politics or cross–strait dialogue.
Second, modes of thought of most of the established Taiwanese pol-
iticians have been changing too slowly since the end of the Martial Law 
(1949–1987) to fully match the modern social reality of the island. Just 
as the KMT under President Ma seems to have come back to an auto-
cratic approach in managing the affairs of the state, so the DPP still 
has not rearranged its political tactics and too often depends on dras-
tic, bellicose measures remembered from the first sessions of the free 
elected Legislative Yuan. The best proofs were the KMT’s temptation to 
turn Legislative Yuan into a rubber stamp parliament in case of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) related regulations 
or explanations of DPP officials, that radical attitude is the only way to 
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win the attention of the public – just like it was in the first democrat-
ic years in the 1990s. Meanwhile, both dominant Taiwanese political 
parties did not prevent the growing part of the society from losing trust 
in politicians and turning its back on official channels of political com-
munication.
Finally, regardless how paradox this may sound, the Taiwanese polit-
ical scene lacked effective opposition. The DPP electoral win was a con-
sequence of KMT failure rather than of DPP success. Obviously, the DPP 
remained the only force able to confront the KMT on the national politi-
cal scene. However, it had no clear image of itself other than opposing the 
KMT far beyond the extent justified by the disproportion of political, so-
cial and financial assets between them. Despite an increase of popularity 
in opinion polls it seemed to be satisfied with being a label for opposition 
movements rather than a fully developed political alternative to the KMT 
(Decision Making Research 2015; Liberty Times 2015; Taiwan Indicator 
Survey Research 2015; TVBS Poll Center 2015). This led to a situation 
when the political scene was dominated by one party – the KMT – with 
a still strong organization and financial support, while the role of the op-
position was to highlight potential problems not taken into account by the 
ruling party. At the same moment the opposition had no viable program 
how to actually deal with these problems, leaving the decision to the rul-
ing party, which is particularly visible in the context of policies regarding 
economic cooperation with the PRC.1 
These developments influence not just Taiwanese internal politics. 
PRC central authorities understand that the opportunities for active coop-
eration with Taipei are dropping down. Although the Sunflower Movement 
did not become the central element of the recent electoral campaigns in 
Taiwan, the social tensions that exploded in March 2014 translated into 
the worse ever results of the KMT in local elections (The Economist 2014) 
and eventually into a loss in the parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 2015, making future Taiwanese authorities less conciliatory to Beijing 
than under President Ma. The Mainland authorities have to look beyond 
ongoing political changes in Taipei and notice fundamental processes that 
have taken place in the Island over the last twenty years. 
1 For example, during meetings with the diplomatic corps, DPP representatives did 
not present alternative policies and limited themselves to criticizing the KMT and 
working on their PR skills. For a thorough analysis of DPP development and strategies 
that still shape the public image of the party see: Rigger 2011.
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First, China has to find the way to counteract the slow but steady 
changes in dynamics of the Taiwanese economy. As the PRC’s economy 
slows down and labor prices go up, Taiwanese enterprises, especially big 
ones, may slowly start to relocate their assets and naturally turn to oth-
er more attractive venues in East and Southeast Asia. If one takes into 
consideration that it is mostly big businesses that represent Taiwan in 
the PRC, the decrease of the PRC’s political leverage on Taiwan may be 
noticeable. Of course it is impossible to absolutely substitute the Main-
land by other destinations but economic diversification is not out of the 
question. After all, the Taiwanese economy had been developing before 
China’s rise and Taiwanese businessmen have years of experience in en-
trepreneurship in the challenging international environment. Such de-
velopments may work against PRC interests by weakening the strongest 
incentive for closer cooperation with the Mainland.
Second, the Mainland has to manage the mounting negative social 
perceptions of Chinese investment in Taiwan. March 2014 highlighted 
the fact that for the Taiwanese public it is obvious that the Chinese eco-
nomic expansion has a political background. A population of 20 million 
with an enormous export sector and high domestic saturation of services 
obviously is not a promised land for the PRC. Basing on purely economic 
analysis it may be assumed that Taiwan will not be flooded with Chinese 
business, if deals concerning free trade and free services will be accepted. 
Such an argument has one hidden flaw, though. If Taiwan is a relatively 
unattractive market for Chinese expansion and in the same moment is 
a political problem for the PRC, why would the Mainland push for closer 
economic cooperation. Thus, large scale Mainland investment is most of-
ten explained by an assumed political (and hostile to Taiwan) agenda. And 
it is hard to call such a stance of Taiwanese business circles exaggerated as 
Taiwanese businessmen have already expanded to the Mainland and have 
practical experience of the business reality in China. This also translates 
into a failure of the Mainland’s soft power.
Third, China has to notice the socio–economic evolution of Taiwan-
ese society. When the policy of economic engagement was introduced, the 
Taiwanese were still relatively coherent and egalitarian. These times are 
over, though. There is a growing gap between big business elites able to 
invest in the Mainland and the rest of the society. Thus, for the first time 
in Taiwanese modern history economic disparity becomes a social issue 
dividing the small and medium entrepreneurs, who form the majority 
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of the society and are afraid of competition with their counterparts from 
the Mainland, and big business representatives, who, thanks to economic 
assets, were closer to the KMT government, are interested in increasing 
service and trade mobility, and are far less dependent on the Taiwanese 
internal market. The interests of these two groups are different, some-
times contradictory, which generates a  potential for new political divi-
sions in the future. Taiwan has witnessed the first wave of alter–globalist 
discontent with modern capitalist system, which, because of the above-
mentioned nature and consequences of investment in China, becomes 
naturally associated with integration with the PRC.
Despite the fact that the Deng Xiaoping’s “two systems one country” 
approach introduced in the case of Hong Kong was originally designed for 
unification with Taiwan, it does not seem to be applicable in the cross–
strait reality. The policy of “the Mainland buying out Taiwan” had run into 
obstacles requiring a change in the nature of the Taiwan–PRC dialogue. 
The Taiwanese economy is largely dependent on the Chinese market but 
diversification of Taiwanese investment is already slowly taking place. It 
is worth emphasizing that while the process is not entirely politically driv-
en – Taiwan is a free market economy and Taiwanese businessmen realize 
the consequences of the Chinese economy slowing down – the Chinese 
economic expansion is politically motivated, which was already no longer 
possible to camouflage behind the high level diplomatic rapprochement 
of the Xi Jinping and Ma Ying–jeou administrations. The Taiwanese–PRC 
economic integration changed the Taiwanese reality not always in a way 
that is accepted by the society of the island. It seems that both the China 
and Taiwan administrations have to realize that the economic venue of 
closing the political gap between actors on the both sides of the strait is 
not entirely under their control. In some aspects it even seems to be work-
ing against them.
3. Taiwanese Political Background  
of the Cross–Strait Relations
The most obvious sign of changes going under the radar of the high 
level diplomatic rapprochement between Taiwan and China was the Sun-
flower Movement. To the politicians’ surprise students for almost a month 
peacefully occupied the Taiwanese legislature – Legislative Yuan. Although 
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the protests in March 2014 were organized against the ratification of the 
Cross–Strait Service Trade Agreement, negotiated between ROC and PRC 
authorities under the ECFA umbrella, in the broader perspective they 
should be interpreted as an emanation of political, economic and social 
changes going on unnoticed by the institutions of the political system.2 All 
the undesired consequences of President Ma’s strategy suddenly resurfaced 
and turned out to be beyond the control of any political actor.
In the described circumstances, the key issue in terms of possible 
trajectories of development of Taiwan–PRC political relations was the po-
litical attitude of President Ma Ying–jeou. President Ma faced a problem 
whether to approach the modified model of “one China” proposed by the 
Mainland in a  friendly manner. On one hand, it may have led to the 
acceleration of the unification process. On the other hand, it would not 
have been accepted easily by all Taiwanese citizens, most of whom seemed 
to prefer retaining the possible maximum of available sovereignty from 
China. The state of relations between Taiwan and the PRC seemed to be 
greatly influenced by his personal ambitions making the future to a rela-
tively large extent dependent on his political decisions (excluding the pos-
sibility of regional security crisis involving the PRC). As far as formulating 
the answers to both questions is concerned, it seemed that his personal 
views and preferences may have been as important as political and eco-
nomic calculations. It has to be emphasized, that he was the head of the 
strongest political party in Taiwan and the head of the public administra-
tion – what had put him in the very center of both Taiwanese politics and 
the cross–strait dialogue. Thus, to a large extent the way he tackled these 
problems had determined the outcome of the ROC 2016 electoral puzzle 
and the future of relations with the PRC.
Throughout the 25 years after lifting martial law the approach of both 
dominating political parties, the KMT and DPP, to relations with the PRC 
in Taiwan became much more balanced.3 Actually both have resigned 
from the most radical propositions concerning declaring independence or 
unification. Despite the fact that the DPP and KMT still largely perceive 
each other in a 20th century context,4 the most radical stances: full unifi-
2 For thorough economic and political analysis of the ECFA see: Chow (ed.) 2012.
3 For an exquisite analysis of the evolution of party politics in Taiwan see: Fell 2012, 
especially: pp. 84–112.
4 It seems that the demographic situation plays an important role here. The Taiwanese 
society experiences a demographic decline with an overrepresentation of older genera-
tions. From the political competition perspective, it creates a situation when the expe-
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cation or outright independence, slowly became marginal. There seems to 
be three major historical reasons for that.
First, both major Taiwanese parties had largely eliminated the com-
petition and broadened their electoral platforms. This process, just like in 
the case of any maturing democracy, leads the dominant parties to mod-
erate their approaches to fit the broader range of followers. For example, 
terms “Blue” or “Green” are more and more often associated with the 
KMT and DPP respectively, and less with Pan–blue and Pan–green coali-
tions of political parties. Another example is the relatively low support for 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which is the most radical party advocating 
Taiwan’s full independence present in Legislative Yuan.5 The same fate 
was met by the New Party, which was created as a result of a departure of 
the right wing pro–unification KMT members from the KMT in the 1990s 
(Central Election Commission; “Frozen Garlic”). It seems that both the 
DPP and KMT try to control its radical members not to lose its steady and 
wide pools of supporters.
Second, even the short history of democratic Taiwan shows that rad-
ical propositions raise the risk of party splits, which in turn lead without 
an exception to worse electoral performance. The best example is the split 
in the KMT at the beginning of the 21st century, which resulted in the 
first victory of DPP candidate Chen Shui–bian in presidential elections. 
Despite the fact that the KMT originating candidates, James Soong and 
Lien Chan, together had more supporters than the DPP candidate, none 
of them were able to beat Chen Shui–bian individually (Fell 2012, p. 60). 
Another example is the People First Party, created as a  result of James 
Soong’s split with the KMT, which slowly loses social support (Central 
Election Commission; “Frozen Garlic”). One may conclude that Taiwan-
ese politicians have learned to avoid radical forms of disputes between 
party factions.
Finally, one should not forget about the deterioration of relations with 
the PRC during the first and second term of DPP presidency. It was large-
ly an effect of Chinese hostile reactions toward Chen Shui–bian’s real 
and alleged moves toward Taiwanese full independence. Despite the fact 
that in the short run Taiwanese business found ways to go around PRC 
riences of people still remembering the end of martial law may dominate the younger 
generations, which are naturally less inclined to perceive the political situation through 
historical lenses and still further away from political decision–making circles.
5 For survey results since 2000 check: Central Election Commission; “Frozen Garlic.”
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restrictions and continue investment in the Mainland, lack of develop-
ments in the public dimension of international relations created space for 
closer Korean–PRC economic ties, what in the long run translated into 
the deterioration of the competitiveness of Taiwanese economy.6 These 
developments seem to have made both dominant political parties and the 
Taiwanese society as a whole less prone to radicalism and more concilia-
tory towards the PRC, as well as made radicals in both parties reconsider 
their stances. The limits of this conciliatory attitude was shown by the 
Sunflower Movement, though.
When it comes to contemporary relations with the PRC, their picture 
is strongly influenced by President’s Ma Ying–jeou personal ambitions. 
The president became an icon of pro–Chinese policies and his increasing-
ly autocratic approach in enforcing them has led him to a one digit sup-
port in the polls (Muynard 2010). This situation provided the DPP with 
political ammunition as well as led to visible tensions within the KMT. 
If one analyses the president’s biography more closely however, the scope 
of his autocratic ambitions is far less surprising. In the beginning of the 
1990s, he was serving for a period of time (1991–1993) as a deputy of the 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a cabinet–level body in charge of cross–
strait relations. He was also showing a predilection to look for some sort 
of unifying agreement with the PRC. It is remarkable that many observers 
of Taiwanese politics expected him then to join the New Party – represent-
ing a radically pro–unification political stance (Ming–sho 2010). It is also 
worth remembering that as a Justice Minister he opposed some initiatives 
to cancel the remains of martial law in the penal code (Wang 2011). At 
the early stage of his career he was sometimes even labeled as opposing 
democratic reforms.
All the aforementioned issues seemed to be covered by his popular 
anti–corruption campaign and successful mayoral rule in Taipei (1998–
2006). Throughout his first presidential term he was also perceived in 
sharp contrast with the unfolding and unprecedented political scandal 
concerning his predecessor – Chen Shui–bian (The Guardian 2009). This 
has certainly worked in favor of Ma’s more positive picture. However, 
already then he was obviously eager to ameliorate the relations with the 
PRC. After Ma Ying–jeou formally took office, his policies have been large-
ly pro–PRC and have been seen by critics as part of a long–run scheme to 
6 For example, advances in Republic of Korea (ROK) – PRC Free Trade Agreement talks 
–  ROK is the major competitor for Taiwanese IT industry.
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steer Taiwan to eventual unification. Already in 2008 Ma stated that he 
hopes that a cross–strait peace accord could be reached during his term in 
office. Some critics even argue that Ma, rather than follow his campaign 
promise (“no reunification, no independence, and no war”), has been fol-
lowing his father’s will instead, Ma Ho–ling (a Director at Youth Supervi-
sion Committee of the Executive Yuan and Vice Chairman of Performance 
Committee of KMT) whose final words were “Repress independence sup-
porters; Lead (Taiwan) to unification” (The Wall Street Journal 2015). His 
ambitions have even brought common jokes about his will to be the first 
Taiwanese president to shake hands with the president of the PRC, which 
turned out to be true in last months of his presidency.7
One may put a  general statement that while a more resolute stance 
toward China has been more popular in Taiwan, President Ma has shown 
increasing fondness to reach out to the PRC. In effect, he was one of the least 
popular Taiwanese politicians, representing the KMT’s old guard’s rather 
than society’s views on cross–strait relations. However, as the head of the 
public administration he was still able to enforce his will regardless of public 
criticism. As the chairman of the KMT he kept pushing the party toward 
a more pro–Chinese stance than actually the majority of KMT officials enjoy. 
This even led to KMT infighting, highlighted by the Ma Ying–jeou – Wang 
Jin–pyng (the President of Legislative Yuan, KMT member) conflict during 
the Sunflower Movement protests (The South China Morning Post 2013).
According to political logic, it seems that with the end of Ma Ying–
jeou’s second presidential term the KMT should go back to a more bal-
anced approach to PRC–Taiwan relation related issues. Such calculation 
is based on the fact that the KMT as a political party should care about 
7 For many observers Ma’s increasingly conciliatory approach toward the PRC is par-
ticularly visible in terms of evolution of his attitude toward the Tiananmen Square 
Protests. Prior to his election as ROC President, Ma was known to be a very vocal 
supporter of the Chinese democratic movement and had stated that unless Beijing ad-
mitted their wrongdoings at the Tiananmen Square Protests, there would be no talks 
about reunification. This changed dramatically after he won the presidential race. 
Especially DPP officials and followers criticize him for praising the PRC on human 
rights and his steady departure from his mayoral times’ critical view of the Commu-
nists’ handling of the 1989 protests. This was vividly apparent in June 2009, during 
the anniversary of Tiananmen Square, when a leader of the Chinese democracy move-
ment and then student leader Wang Dan visited Taiwan, as in previous years, to meet 
with Ma to discuss about human rights and democracy in China. Ma postponed the 
appointment several times and eventually cancelled it. In a press meeting with DPP 
Chairwoman Tsai Ing–wen, Wang Dan remarkably noticed how different from “May-
or Ma of Taipei City” has “President Ma” become.
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building a stable electoral base, which requires adapting a less pro–unifica-
tion approach than the one represented by the present president. Unfortu-
nately for KMT too much depended on how Ma Ying–jeou would exercise 
power, though. He had proven to be ready to use it to push his view for-
ward (the service–pact case being the most evident example) and to use 
exclusion from KMT membership as a  tool to subordinate inner party 
opposition (Ma–Wang conflict during Legislative Yuan occupation, reshuf-
fling in the public administration in the middle of the 2014). Months be-
fore parliamentary elections the KMT candidates seemed to be caught in 
between the president’s ambitions and society’s electoral preferences. As 
Ma had enforced his will and kept on promoting pro–unification members 
with a long political history, he created an unfavorable image of the party 
petrified in the past and lose a lot of electoral appeal. In the future howev-
er, if KMT members manage to distance the party from Ma’s stance and 
push forward younger and more popular representatives, they will be able 
to capitalize on the strong electoral base and unparalleled financial and 
administrative support to rebuild the earlier, dominant political position.
4. What Comes Next
November 29, 2014, proved to be a shocking day for the KMT. After 
a decade of dominance in local government and Parliament, it suffered the 
worst defeat in the island’s electoral history. It kept hold of just 6 of the 
22 municipalities and counties, while the opposition – the DPP – scored 
13 for its side (Huang 2014). Many foreign observers attribute the results 
to a setback in cross–strait talks between Taiwan and China caused by 
the Sunflower Movement and to the Hong Kong protests that came a few 
months later. However, while the Sunflower Movement and Grand Cen-
tral sit–ins have been catching the foreign media’s attention, in Taiwan 
they were in a background rather than in the fore of the political cam-
paign. From the local perspective, the November elections’ results were 
yet another proof that the leading Taiwanese politicians’ ambitions cloud 
the aspirations of the society they represent (Glaser & Vitello 2014). The 
Parliamentary and Presidential elections’ results were just a mere confir-
mation of this fact.
The loss creates a space for soul–searching and correcting the political 
course. In the longer run, according to electoral logic it seems that with the 
end of Ma Ying–jeou’s second presidential term the KMT should develop 
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an approach more centered on Taiwanese issues and go back to more bal-
anced approach to PRC–Taiwan relations. Such calculation is based on the 
fact that the KMT as a political party should respond to the electorate’s 
preferences and adapt more socially conscious policies emphasizing a less 
pro–unification approach than one represented by the present president 
and KMT old–timers. Middle level KMT candidates seemed to be caught 
in between the president’s ambitions and society’s electoral preferences. 
The question of central importance concerns the KMT’s approach to the 
challenge. It seems that the key problem is to find new impulses for eco-
nomic development as the limits of socially acceptable economic and cul-
tural integration within the existing framework of contacts with the PRC 
have been reached. The inability of the KMT to make Taiwan business 
and society to overcome limitations in regard to international, non–Chi-
nese competition, remains the most important issue here. From a social 
perspective the 2010 ECFA and one–sided Taiwanese concessions are not 
entirely functional for Taiwan. This generates growing social frustration 
which can no longer remain not addressed.
However, it is worth noting that such a state of facts is not function-
al also for the PRC. The fundamental goal of the Mainland is to further 
accelerate the cross–strait dialogue. PRC leaders are conscious that they 
urgently need to begin the political dialogue with Taiwan, as the term of 
Ma Ying–jeou comes to an end in 2015 (presidential elections will take 
place in January 2016) and many political forecasts show a growing pos-
sibility of a victory of his political opposition.8 This in turn may slow 
down and limit Beijing’s opportunities to peacefully exercise influence 
on Taiwanese politics. However, if the political dialogue is to accelerate 
within the today’s framework of ROC–PRC relationships, the frame-
work itself is insufficient to develop a sustainable political dialogue with 
Taiwan.9 Thus, from the Mainland’s perspective the goal for the com-
ing years is to develop together with Taiwan a common understanding 
of the “one China” policy, which may allow to accelerate the political 
dialogue.
The goals of Beijing’s policies toward Taiwan seem to be concentrated 
on the development of a positive image of the PRC based on soft power 
rather than economic omnipotence. This is confirmed by readiness to 
8 Editor’s note: presidential election was won by DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing–wen.
9 The 1992 consensus assumes a wider scope of Taiwan international space, development 
of military trust and finally peace agreement.
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sign the ECFA agreement and to erect trade offices on both sides of the 
strait. One may form a conclusion that the PRC is somehow ready to ac-
knowledge the administrational jurisdiction of Taipei on Taiwan. Accept-
ing Taiwan administrative competencies has its limits, like not accepting 
“two Chinas” in practice of international organizations, though. Taiwan’s 
activity in some international organizations as a non–state and de–sov-
ereignized entity was accepted by the PRC. Thus, one may state that Tai-
wan’s pressure on broadening the scope of international organizations it 
is active in, is a sort of a confirmation to the international community 
that Taiwan acknowledges such a status. This leads to a conclusion that 
the consequences of President Ma’s political success in 2008 were: (a) 
strengthening the administrative independence at the cost of limiting sov-
ereignty, and (b) strengthening Taiwanese consciousness of the society at 
the expense of more passive approach to the unification scenarios. How-
ever, after several years these processes are conflicting with one another, 
as the Sunflower Movement has showcased.10
The changes in Taiwanese internal politics raise a more general ques-
tion about the nature of the Taiwan’s future international behavior. The 
strategy of the KMT–PRC getting closer was possible in context of the 
PRC’s economic rise and the PRC’s growing soft power. It was realized on 
the basis of high level diplomatic involvement. It seems that the strategy 
grew too old to match the 2016 Taiwanese reality. The PRC’s economy 
slowed down, which slowly makes Taiwanese business to look for other 
markets. The PRC’s soft power suffered due to the Hong Kong protests. 
The high level talks without consulting the public were one of the reasons 
of the Sunflower Movement formation. It seems that Taiwanese democra-
cy is simply too strong to be managed the way it was before.
From the foreign perspective it is important to emphasize that the 
cross–strait relations actually played a secondary role in the 2015 parlia-
mentary and presidential campaign. It is also important to notice that 
10 One should also take into account a potential international crisis involving the PRC 
– especially in the vicinity of Taiwan, which may generate an electoral swing against 
the KMT. The way the PRC has been dealing with the Crimea crisis seems to point 
out that China is still able to exercise a balanced and sublime international strategy 
to appease international society. The East China and South China Seas are a differ-
ent problem, though. Taiwanese society after March 2014, especially young voters, 
may be more afraid of the PRC’s ambitions regarding Taiwan (Beijing’s soft power 
definitely suffered because of the Sunflower Movement, not to mention occasional 
setbacks, like the academic scandal during the Confucius Institute conference in 
Portugal in August 2014).
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the results did not cause significant changes in relations with the Main-
land. Throughout the campaign the DPP candidates pledged to keep 
good relations with PRC sister cities and not to rock the boat in case 
they win. Numerous candidates promised to continue and facilitate 
business with the Mainland. In fact, the DPP representatives active in 
local government prior to the elections already have a good record in that 
respect. The local population is obviously weary of excessive rapproche-
ment and the way the Mainland managed the Hong Kong protests tar-
nished the image of the PRC even further. However, opposite to foreign 
assessments the cross–strait dialogue was never a dominant element of 
the campaign.
The possibility of changes in Taiwanese politics, both in terms of 
change of guard within the KMT and of DPP electoral wins in 2016, re-
quires to maintain a higher than before level of attention to the domestic 
developments in Taiwan. It also requires to further monitor the PRC poli-
cy toward Taiwan as it may become a swing factor in the island’s internal 
affairs. President Xi’s harder approach with no apparent new incentives 
for Taiwanese to continue along the PRC–ROC course under Ma will defi-
nitely play against the interests of advocates of further rapprochement. 
It may also work against the PRC’s interest in the context of the United 
States (US) presidential elections in 2016, when relations between the 
US and PRC may be exposed to many tests. Nevertheless, if China is 
planning to keep what it has already gained, it needs to depend more on 
encouragement than threat.
It is also high time for the Western countries to notice the social 
consensus around the democratic system in Taiwan. Taiwan belongs 
to the democratic world. It corresponds to something more than just 
formal institutions. It refers to common democratic values remarkably 
implemented in Taiwan. As the electoral dust settled the most impor-
tant aspect in Taiwanese politics proved to be, both in internal and in-
ternational terms, the growing identification of the local population as 
Taiwanese rather than Chinese, especially among the young generation. 
In the future this involves a possibility of growing aspirations of the is-
landers for recognition on terms at odds with Beijing. Those who more 
closely follow the cross–strait dialogue may point out, that it is not the 
first time when Taiwanese identity resurfaces in regional politics. One 
of accusations against Chen Shui–bian was to play this card in the DPP 
political campaign, with no regards for the stability of relations with the 
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Mainland. This time however, it started to develop genuinely outside of 
the formal political establishment. By all means it is a factor that should 
not be underestimated in the complex geopolitical reality of the South 
and East China Sea.
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